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Abstract—Network embedding maps a network into a low-dimensional Euclidean space, and thus facilitate many network analysis
tasks, such as node classification, link prediction and community detection etc, by utilizing machine learning methods. In social networks,
we may pay special attention to user privacy, and would like to prevent some target nodes from being identified by such network analysis
methods in certain cases. Inspired by successful adversarial attack on deep learning models, we propose a framework to generate
adversarial networks based on the gradient information in Graph Convolutional Network (GCN). In particular, we extract the gradient
of pairwise nodes based on the adversarial network, and select the pair of nodes with maximum absolute gradient to realize the Fast
Gradient Attack (FGA) and update the adversarial network. This process is implemented iteratively and terminated until certain condition
is satisfied, i.e., the number of modified links reaches certain predefined value. Comprehensive attacks, including unlimited attack, direct
attack and indirect attack, are performed on six well-known network embedding methods. The experiments on real-world networks
suggest that our proposed FGA behaves better than some baseline methods, i.e., the network embedding can be easily disturbed using
FGA by only rewiring few links, achieving state-of-the-art attack performance.
Index Terms—Network embedding, adversarial network, gradient attack, node classification, community detection, deep learning
F
1 INTRODUCTION
OUR lives are surrounded by various networks, such associal networks, communication networks, biological
networks, traffic networks and so on. Network embed-
ding [1]–[3], used to learn low-dimensional representations
for nodes or links in the network, is capable to benefit a wide
range of real-world applications such as link prediction [4],
[5], node classification [6], [7], community detection [8], [9],
social network analysis [10] etc. The embedding methods
will directly determine the performances of downstream
applications, and thus have been receiving more and more
attentions in the past decades.
Some earlier works, including IsoMAP [11], local linear
embedding [12] and Laplacian eigenmap [13], tried to em-
bed the network by decomposing the similarity matrix. In
the last few years, on the other hand, more and more studies
focused on embedding the network into a low-dimensional
vector space. For instance, since Mikolov et al. [14] pro-
posed the word2vec model, the skip-gram mechanism is
widely adopted in many network embedding methods,
such as DeepWalk [4], LINE [15] and node2vec [16] etc.
DeepWalk [4] was the first model to learn language from a
network, which adopts random walk to sample a sequence
of nodes for each node, and then treats these sequences as
sentences by the skip-gram mechanism. LINE [15] can be
considered as a special case of DeepWalk, with the window
size of contexts set to 1. Node2vec [16] is an extension
of DeepWalk, which is more flexible when generating the
context of a node. The generated contexts of nodes are also
treated as text in a language model to learn the embeddings
by the skip-gram mechanism. Another embedding method,
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namely GraRep, is proposed by Cao et al. [17], which
preserves node proximities by constructing different k-step
probability transition matrices.
Quite recently, a few deep embedding methods were
proposed, which are generally based on generative adver-
sarial networks (GAN) [18] and graph convolutional net-
work (GCN) [19]. For example, Wang et al. [20] proposed
GraphGAN as a novel network representation learning
framework, which unifies two classes of graph represen-
tation learning methodologies via adversarial training in
a minimax game. Dai et al. [21] proposed an adversarial
network embedding method, which adopts the adversarial
learning principle to regularize the representation learning.
On the other hand, Kipf et al. [19] proposed the GCN
as a basic graph convolution method for semi-supervised
classification, which learns the hidden layer representations
that encode both local graph structure and features of nodes.
Moreover, Pham et al. [22] introduced Column Network
(CLN) as a novel deep learning model for collective classifi-
cation, inspired by the columnar organization of neocortex.
Although deep learning methods achieve great success
in many real-world tasks, such as computer vision [23],
natural language process [24] and so on, they are confronted
with security problem [25]. The most typical one is adver-
sarial attack [26]–[34], i.e., in computer vision tasks, we can
add a designed tiny perturbation into an original image to
fool a CNN model, leading to the wrong classification of the
image [26]. The study of network analysis attacks, on the
other hand, roots in the need for protecting the user privacy
from, or understanding the robustness of, those state-of-the-
art network analysis methods.
For instance, in community detection, Nagaraja [35]
proposed the first community deception method by adding
links to the nodes of high centrality. Inspired by modularity,
Waniek et al. [36] proposed a scalable heuristic method,
namely Disconnect Internally, Connect Externally (DICE),
which randomly deletes the links between the nodes in
the target community, while adds the links between them
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2and those of different communities. Besides, Fionda et
al. [37] proposed a novel community deception method
based on the safeness which evaluates the hiding level of
a target community in the output of a detection algorithm.
In link prediction, Zheleva et al. [38] proposed a link re-
identification attack to inferring sensitive links from the
released data. Link perturbation is a common technique
in early research that data publisher can randomly modify
links on the original network to protect the sensitive links
from being identified. Fard et al. [39] introduced a subgraph-
wise perturbation in directed networks to randomize the
destination of a link within subgraphs to protect sensitive
links; they further proposed a neighborhood randomization
mechanism to probabilistically randomize the destination of
a link within a local neighborhood [40].
More interestingly, Zu¨gner et al. [41] focused on the node
classification using GCN, and proposed the first adversarial
attacks on networks, namely NETTACK, which generated
adversarial network iteratively. In each iteration, it first
selected candidate links and features based on their impor-
tant data characteristics such as degree distribution and co-
occurence of features; then, it defined two scoring functions
to evaluate the change in the confidence value of the target
node after modifying a link and feature in the candidate
sets, respectively; after that, it used the link or feature of the
highest score to update the adversarial network. However,
this approach is limited to node classification task, with little
discussion on the transferability of the attack. On the other
hand, while network embedding methods are getting more
and more popular in network analysis, their security prob-
lem is largely ignored. We argue that the security problem of
network embedding is more crucial than that of a particular
network analysis method in community detection or link
prediction, because if an embedding method is attacked, all
downstream applications based on the obtained embedding
vectors could be affected correspondingly.
Inspired by [41], in this paper, we propose a new fast
gradient attack (FGA) on network embedding. Specifically,
we make the following contributions.
• First, we design an adversarial network generator, uti-
lizing the iterative gradient information of pairwise
nodes based on the trained GCN model to generate
adversarial network so as to realize the FGA.
• Second, we use FGA to attack not only GCN model but
also several other network embedding methods, such
as GraRep, DeepWalk, node2vec, LINE and Graph-
GAN, and propose various adversarial attack strategies
to attack multiple network analysis methods.
• Third, the experiments validate that our FGA method
performs significantly better than several advanced at-
tack methods such as NETTACK and DICE, in terms of
higher Attack Success Rates (ASR) and smaller Average
number of Modified Links (AML) to successfully attack
a target node, on a number of real-world networks,
achieving state-of-the-art attack effects.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2,
we introduce our FGA method in details and explain the
white-box and black-box adversarial attacks. In Sec. 3, we
empirically evaluate FGA on multiple tasks, and compare
the attack effects by utilizing FGA and other attack methods
TABLE 1: The definitions of symbols.
Symbol Definition
G = (V,E) input original network with nodes V and links E
G¯ = (V, E¯,M) perturbation network with nodes V , links E¯ and weight M
Gˆ = (V, Eˆ) attacked network with nodes V and updated links Eˆ
A the adjacency matrix of original network G
A˜ the adjacency matrix added self-connections
IN identity matrix
D˜ degree matrix of A˜
Y ′(A) the output of the GCN model
f and σ the softmax function and Relu active function
X the matrix of node feature vectors
A¯ the convolved signal matrix
Wi the weight matrices of GCN model
C the number of feature vector dimensions in X
H the number of feature maps for hidden layer
F the categories set for nodes in the network
L the loss function of the GCN model
VL the set of nodes with labels
Y the real label confidence list
η learning rate
vt target node
Lt target loss function for node vt
g link gradient matrix
gˆ link gradient network
K the number of modified links
Gˆh the hth adversarial network
Aˆh the hth adversarial adjacency matrix
gˆh the hth link gradient network
θ the sign function
nt the number of links of the target node in G
b the number of links we random disconnect
γ perturbation size
on several real-world networks. In Sec. 4, we conclude the
paper and highlight future research directions.
2 METHOD
In this section, we introduce the framework of FGA on
network embedding, where we propose an adversarial net-
work generator based the GCN model. For convenience,
the definitions of symbols used in this paper are briefly
summarized in TABLE 1.
2.1 Problem Definition
We first give the definitions of network embedding and
network embedding attack as follows.
• Network embedding: It learns a mapping : vi → yi ∈
Rd of nodes in network G = (V,E) to features in a low-
dimensional space, based on which the downstream
methods can be designed to realize node classification
or clustering tasks etc. Generally, the dimension of each
node d is much smaller than the number of nodes |V |.
• Network embedding attack: Given the network G =
(V,E), network embedding attack selects some key
links for target nodes to construct the perturbation net-
work G¯ = (V, E¯,M), where Mij ∈ {−1, 0, 1} indicates
the modification strategy of E¯ij ∈ E¯. Then, the links Eˆ
in the attacked network Gˆ = (V, Eˆ) is defined as
Eˆij = Eij +MijE¯ij . (1)
In this attacked network, the target nodes can be well
hidden, e.g., they will be misclassified with a relatively high
probability in a node classification task.
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Fig. 1: The framework of FGA on network embedding methods.
2.2 The Framework of FGA
Adversarial attack is launched by latent adversarial samples
with minimized alternation from normal ones. In this study,
the adversarial networks are elaborately designed to fool
network embedding methods. When the original network
is inputted, vectors of nodes are learned based on network
embedding methods for a specific task, e.g., node classifi-
cation, with satisfying performance. Then, we choose the
target nodes, and generate adversarial networks to hide
them, i.e., to make them misclassified. In other words, when
the adversarial networks are inputted, the vectors of most
nodes will keep the same as those in the original network,
i.e., they will be correctly classified, while the target nodes
will be unconsciously misclassified due to their significantly
changed vectors. More remarkably, the adversarial networks
are almost the same as the original one, e.g., only 1 to 6 links
need to be rewired in a network of more than 5000 links in
total. In particular, our FGA method consists of two stages:
adversarial network generation and adversarial attack, as
shown in Fig. 1.
• Adversarial network generation: Given a network, the
adversarial network is generated based on the GCN
gradient. First, we use the original network to train the
GCN model. Then, for each target node, we design a
target loss function, based on which we calculate the
partial derivative, and further the gradient information,
for each pair of nodes in the network. After that, we se-
lect the pair of nodes of the maximum absolute gradient
to update the adversarial network. Finally, we stop the
process when a certain number of links are modified,
and then output the final adversarial network.
• Adversarial attack: We then use the generated ad-
versarial network to protect the target node from the
detection of GCN model. Since GCN has overwhelming
generalization ability, the adversarial attack can be still
effective for many other network embedding methods,
i.e., the perturbation generated by GCN is universal
and the attack thus has strong transferability.
2.3 Adversarial Network Generator via GCN
In this stage, we use the GCN model to generate adversarial
networks, described as follows.
2.3.1 GCN model
We consider a two-layer GCN model for node classification
in a network with the adjacency matrix A. A˜ = A + IN
is the adjacency matrix of the undirected network G with
the added self-connections, where IN is the identity matrix.
D˜ii =
∑
j A˜ij is the degree matrix of A˜.
We consider the GCN model with a single hidden layer,
and its forward model takes the simple form:
Y ′(A) = f(A¯σ(A¯XW0)W1), (2)
where X is a matrix of node feature vectors, A¯ =
D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2 = D˜−
1
2 (A + IN )D˜
− 12 , W0 ∈ RC×H and
W1 ∈ RH×|F | are the input-to-hidden and hidden-to-output
weight matrices, respectively, with the hidden layer of H
feature maps; f and σ are the softmax function and Relu
active function, respectively. Here, the softmax activation
function is applied row-wise.
4For node classification, we evaluate the cross-entropy
error over all training examples:
L = −
|VL|∑
l=1
|F |∑
k=1
Ylk ln(Y
′
lk(A)), (3)
where VL is the set of nodes with labels, F = [τ1, · · · , τ|F |] is
the category set for the nodes in the network, |F | denotes the
number of categories, Y is the real label matrix with Ylk = 1
if node vl belongs to category τk and Ylk = 0 otherwise, and
Y ′(A) is the output of the model calculated by Eq. (2). In the
m-th iteration step, the weights Wi, i ∈ {0, 1}, of the neural
network model are trained using gradient descent, with the
update role
Wm+1i = W
m
i − η
∂L
∂Wmi
, (4)
where η is the learning rate.
2.3.2 Link gradient based on GCN
According to Eq. (4), the weight matrices are updated based
on the gradient information in the GCN model, so that the
model is continuously optimized and the node classification
performance is steadily improved. As we can see in Eq. (2)
and Eq. (3), the adjacency matrix A is another group of
variables in the loss function. We thus can use the gradient
information of the adjacency matrix to realize the attack, i.e.,
lead to an error in the node classification.
Based on the trained GCN model, we further design a
target loss function Lt as
Lt = −
|F |∑
k=1
Ytk ln(Y
′
tk(A)), (5)
which represents the difference between the predicted label
and the real one of the target node vt. The larger value of
this loss function corresponds to the worse prediction result.
We then calculate the partial derivatives of the target loss
function Lt with respect to the element of adjacency matrix,
Aij , in the network, and further obtain all the link gradient
matrix g, represented by
gij =
∂Lt
∂Aij
, (6)
with Aij being an element of A.
Here, we aim to maximize the target loss function Lt.
Generally, link changes along the same direction of the
gradient can make the target loss function Lt increase fastest
locally, resulting in the misclassification of the target node
quickly using the trained GCN model. Considering that the
adjacent matrix of an undirected network is symmetry, here
we symmetrize g to obtain gˆ.
gˆij = gˆji =
{ gij+gji
2 i 6= j
0 i = j
(7)
We treat gˆ as a link gradient network (LGN), where each
pair of nodes could be connected with a positive or nega-
tive weight denoting the link gradient, with the following
meanings:
• Sign: A positive/negative link gradient gˆij indicates
that adding/deleting the link between the pair of nodes
(vi, vj) will increase the target loss function.
• Magnitude: The larger magnitude of link gradient gˆij
means the added/deleted link between the pair of
nodes (vi, vj) can influence the classification result of
the target node more significantly.
2.3.3 Adversarial network generator
Based on Eq. (6), we propose a model to generate adversarial
networks to realize the efficient attack on the original net-
work. In this model, we modify a link during each iteration,
and the process lasts for K iterations in total. The hth
iteration can be described by the following steps.
• Constructing the LGN: Based on Eq. (6) and Eq. (7), we
generate the (h− 1)th LGN gˆh−1 using the adversarial
network adjacency matrix Aˆh−1, with Aˆ0 = A.
• Selecting the target pair of nodes: Based on gˆh−1, we
select a pair of nodes (vi, vj) of the maximum absolute
link gradient. Note that, if they have positive/negative
gradient and meanwhile are connected/disconnected
in the original network, we cannot further add/remove
the link between them. Therefore, we just ignore such
pairs of nodes in the process.
• Realize the attack: We use the selected pair of nodes
(vi, vj) to attack the (h− 1)th adversarial network, and
generate the adversarial network Gˆh. The adjacency
matrix Aˆh of the hth adversarial network is defined as:
Aˆhij = Aˆ
h−1
ij + θ(gˆij), (8)
where Aˆhij and Aˆ
h−1
ij are the elements of Aˆ
h and Aˆh−1,
respectively, and θ(gˆij) represents the sign of gradient
of the selected pair of nodes (vi, vj).
The pseudo-code for the adversarial network generator is
given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Adversarial network generator via GCN
Input: Original network G, number of iterations K .
Output: The adversarial network Gˆ.
1 Train the GCN model on original network G to obtain
gˆ0 via Eq. (6) and Eq. (7);
2 Initialize the adjacency matrix of the adversarial
network by Aˆ0 = A;
3 for h = 1 to K do
4 Construct gˆh−1 based on the Aˆh−1;
5 Select the pair of nodes (vi, vj) of the maximum
absolute link gradient in gˆh−1;
6 Update the adjacency matrix Aˆh by
Aˆhij = Aˆ
h−1
ij + θ(gˆij);
7 end
8 return The adversarial network Gˆ, with the adjacency
matrix of adversarial network AˆK .
2.4 White-Box Adversarial Attack
Here, we perform the white-box adversarial attack, i.e.,
using the adversarial network to attack the GCN model.
Specifically, the proposed adversarial network generator
generates an adversarial network with tiny perturbations,
and the re-trained GCN model with the generated adver-
sarial network fails to classify the target nodes correctly. In
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Fig. 2: Adversarial network attack generator via GCN.
particular, we will consider direct, indirect, and unlimited
attacks, respectively, described as follows.
• Direct attack: Typically, individuals may have very lim-
ited knowledge of the social ties beyond their friends,
but rather, they can easily manage their immediate
neighborhoods. In order to simulate such cases, we only
consider to attack the links around the target nodes, i.e.,
remove existent links of the target nodes or add new
ones to them.
• Indirect attack: When selecting the links to be mod-
ified in the adversarial network attack generator, we
find some indirect links (i.e., they are not immediately
connected to the target nodes) may also have an impact
on the classification result of the target nodes. In certain
situations, such indirect links might be preferred to be
changed by the network manager in order to make the
attack more concealed.
• Unlimited attack: In this case, we don’t limit the attack
to the direct or indirect links, i.e., we can remove or add
a link between any pair of nodes, in order to seek the
maximum attack effect.
2.5 Black-Box Adversarial Attack
We also perform the adversarial attack generated by GCN
to attack other embedding methods, to validate that such
attack is quite universal. Since many embedding methods
with any downstream classification or regression algorithms
have similar decision boundaries, we believe the GCN-
based adversarial attack can also be effective on many other
embedding methods.
The strong transferability of such adversarial attacks
may bring the security concern for network embedding
applications, since malicious examples may be easily crafted
even when the target network embedding method is un-
known in advance. Moreover, in network theory, hub nodes
and bridge nodes play important roles in many network
dynamics and algorithms. Therefore, we also perform the
adversarial attack on such special nodes to see the anti-
attack ability of FGA on the critical part of the network.
3 EXPERIMENTS
In order to testify the effectiveness of our FGA method,
we compare it with some baseline attack methods by per-
forming a number of experiments, including uniform attack,
hub-node attack, bridge-node attack and community de-
ception. Our experimental environment consists of i7-7700K
3.5GHzx8 (CPU), TITAN Xp 12GiB (GPU), 16GBx4 memory
(DDR4) and Ubuntu 16.04 (OS).
3.1 Datasets
In the task of node classification, each node in a network is
assigned a label, and the following three networks are used.
Their basic statistics are summarized in TABLE 2.
• Pol.Blogs: The Pol.Blogs dataset is compiled by Adamic
and Glance [42]. This dataset is about political leaning
collected from blog directories. The blogs are divided
into two classes. The links between blogs were auto-
matically extracted from the front pages of the blogs. It
contains 1,490 blogs and 19,090 links in total.
• Cora: This dataset contains a number of machine-
learning papers of seven classes [43]. The links between
papers represent the citation relationships. It contains
2,708 papers and 5,429 links in total.
• Citeseer: This dataset is also a paper citation network
with the papers divided into six classes [43]. It contains
3,312 papers and 4,732 citation links in total.
3.2 Baseline Methods
We compare our FGA method with three network embed-
ding attack methods. Suppose the target node vt has nt links
6TABLE 2: The basic statistics of the three network datasets.
Dataset #Nodes #Links #Classes
Pol.Blogs 1,490 19,090 2
Cora 2,708 5,429 7
Citeseer 3,312 4,732 6
in the original network. These baseline methods are briefly
described as follows.
• Random Attack (RA). RA randomly disconnects b
(b < K) links in the original network, while randomly
connects K − b pairs of nodes that are originally not
connected. This is the simplest attack method.
• Disconnect Internally, Connect Externally (DICE) [36].
DICE first randomly disconnect b links of target node,
then randomly connect the target node to K − b nodes
of different classes.
• NETTACK [41]. NETTACK generates adversarial net-
work iteratively. In each iteration, it selects candidate
links based on the degree distribution; then, it defines
a scoring function, meaning the confidence loss of the
target node in the trained GCN model when a certain
link is changed; after that, it utilizes the scores of the
candidate links to update the adversarial network.
For RA and DICE, we simply set b = nt/2 if nt < K ; and
b = K/2 otherwise.
In order to validate the transfer ability of our FGA
method, besides GCN, we also compare it with the three
baseline methods on attacking other network embedding
approaches including GraRep, DeepWalk, Node2vec, LINE
and GraphGAN.
We randomly choose 20% nodes in a network as the
labeled nodes, which are divided into the training and
validation sets of equal size. The rest 80% nodes are used for
testing. For all the network embedding methods, the vector
dimension is set to 128, the number of walks per node is set
to 10, the length of walk is set to 80 and the size of context
window is set to 10. For LINE method, the negative ratio
is set to 5. The feature vectors are inputted into a logistic
regression classifier to perform node classification with 9:1
train-test ratio.
3.3 Results
Now, let’s present the attack results obtained by our FGA
method and the baseline methods on GCN and other several
network embedding methods. We use the following two
metrics to measure the attack effectiveness.
• ASR: The attack success rate, i.e., the ratio of the suc-
cessfully attacked embeddings of nodes, i.e., leading the
misclassification of the node, versus all target nodes, by
changing no more than γ links for each target node.
For a certain value of γ, the larger ASR corresponds to
the better attack effect. Here, the perturbation size γ is
varied from 1 to 20.
• AML: The average number of modified links to success-
fully attack the embedding of a target node. Here, to
avoid changing too many links, we limit each method
to modify at most 20 links. In other words, if the
embedding of the target node is unable to be success-
fully attacked by modifying 20 links, we simply set the
number as 20. The smaller AML corresponds to the
better attack effect.
3.3.1 Uniform attack
In this part, for each network, we random select 20 nodes
in each category as the target nodes. The attack results are
presented in TABLE 3, where we can see that the unlimited
FGA outperforms all the other attack methods in all the
cases, in terms of higher ASR and lower AML. Surprisingly,
for the datasets of Cora and Citeseer, we can achieve 100%
ASR when 20 links are changed for each target node. While
for Pol.Blogs, we can only get 84.47% ASR on average,
which may be because this network is relatively dense, with
the average degree close to 25.6. Even though, the unlim-
ited FGA still performs best on attacking any considered
network embedding method. It might be argued that, for
NETTACK and DICE, only those links around the target
nodes are allowed to be changed, i.e., they can be considered
as direct attacks. Therefore, it seems to be fairer to compare
them with our direct FGA, rather than unlimited FGA. In
fact, we can still find that our direct FGA presents better
attack effect than NETTACK and DICE in most cases.
In particular, for the datasets of Cora and Citeseer, on
average, we only need to change no more than 6 links
to successfully attack the embedding of a target node for
any network embedding method considered in this paper,
by using our unlimited FGA. By comparison, we need to
change more links in Pol.Blogs to successfully attack the
network embedding methods, due to its denser structure.
Overall, although our FGA attack is based on GCN, it has
strong trasnferability to attack other network embedding
methods, i.e., in TABLE 3 we can see that both unlimited and
direct FGA achieve higher ASR and lower AML than the
three baseline attack methods, while DICE and RA are not
designed for a particular network embedding method. On
the other hand, white-box attack indeed performs slightly
better than black-box attack, e.g., for the datasets of Cora
and Citeseer, when unlimited FGA and direct FGA are used
to attack GCN, on average, only less than 4 links need to be
changed to make the attack successful.
More interestingly, for the datasets of Cora and Citeseer,
where the networks are relatively sparse, indirect FGA can
also achieve reasonable attack effect, similar to DICE. This
indicates that we may also change the links far from the
target nodes to realize the attack. In other words, the local
structure of these nodes is not necessarily destroyed, making
the attack more concealed. However, again it seems that
indirect FGA doesn’t work on Pol.Blogs, i.e., it only per-
forms better than random attack. This is reasonable, since
changing only 20 links far from a target node of mean degree
larger than 25 seems not enough to cheat the algorithm to
classify it into a wrong group.
Moreover, we also calculate the attack effect, in terms of
ASR, obtained by different attack methods, under different
perturbation size γ, varied from 1 to 20. Here, direct FGA is
adopted to make fair comparison. The results are shown in
Fig. 3-Fig. 5, for different datasets, where we can find that
the direct FGA performs best no matter what perturbation
size is adopted; NETTACK is better than DICE in most
cases; while all of these heuristic and adversarial attacks
behave much better than the random attack, indicating
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Fig. 3: ASR of different attack methods as functions of perturbation size γ on various network embedding methods for
Polblogs dataset.
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Fig. 4: ASR of different attack methods as functions of perturbation size γ on various network embedding methods for
Cora dataset.
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Fig. 5: ASR of different attack methods as functions of perturbation size γ on various network embedding methods for
Citeseer dataset.
8TABLE 3: The attack effects, in terms of ASR and AML, obtained by different attack methods on varous network embedding
methods and multiple datasets. Here, ASR is obtained by changing 20 links.
Dataset NEM
ASR (%) AML
FGA Baseline FGA Baseline
Unlimited Direct Indirect NETTACK DICE RA Unlimited Direct Indirect NETTACK DICE RA
Pol.Blogs
GCN 87.87 85.74 25.53 82.97 50.27 0.00 8.42 8.82 17.61 11.89 11.85 20.00
GraRep 83.88 81.66 4.25 79.91 61.06 0.00 9.58 10.42 19.36 10.48 14.22 20.00
DeepWalk 84.26 81.66 6.25 75.41 64.52 0.00 9.84 10.93 19.20 10.06 12.35 20.00
node2vec 84.34 81.83 0.00 78.32 67.89 0.00 9.72 10.16 20.00 10.58 14.86 20.00
LINE 85.25 82.03 0.00 76.35 66.74 0.00 9.90 11.01 20.00 10.26 12.82 20.00
GraphGAN 81.21 80.24 0.00 72.26 64.58 0.00 9.41 11.02 20.00 11.08 12.26 20.00
Average 84.47 82.19 6.01 77.54 62.51 0.00 9.48 10.39 19.36 10.73 13.06 20.00
Cora
GCN 100 100 88.28 92.87 54.95 6.31 2.54 3.21 6.77 6.09 9.13 16.99
GraRep 100 100 84.47 97.22 89.09 9.43 5.56 5.57 9.41 5.94 7.37 18.43
DeepWalk 100 97.22 81.55 94.06 93.52 12.16 5.61 6.27 10.59 7.24 7.20 17.69
node2vec 100 100 84.00 97.29 89.09 9.43 5.66 5.58 9.52 6.75 7.37 18.43
LINE 100 96.04 84.47 96.34 88.99 13.08 5.64 6.36 9.41 7.02 7.66 18.07
GraphGAN 100 96.00 84.62 92.26 84.55 8.49 5.65 6.40 11.02 8.82 7.96 18.60
Average 100 98.21 84.57 95.01 83.37 9.82 5.11 5.57 9.62 6.98 7.78 18.04
Citeseer
GCN 100 100 91.36 87.50 70.37 2.47 3.52 3.88 7.69 6.88 9.87 19.36
GraRep 100 98.39 98.41 94.28 93.22 32.26 5.32 6.23 8.25 6.51 7.56 15.09
DeepWalk 100 100 100 96.96 93.44 36.51 5.68 6.06 7.76 7.06 7.08 14.41
node2vec 100 100 98.21 93.93 91.38 34.43 5.62 6.50 7.75 6.34 7.13 14.87
LINE 100 100 98.36 95.82 96.72 32.26 5.88 6.25 7.56 6.02 7.21 15.27
GraphGAN 100 97.89 93.15 92.06 88.24 20.00 5.91 6.67 8.18 7.42 8.26 16.55
Average 100 99.38 96.75 93.43 88.90 26.32 5.16 5.93 7.85 6.71 7.98 15.92
that network structure does matter in attacking network
embedding methods.
Lastly, we want to compare the time complexity between
the direct FGA method and the NETTACK method, as two
comparable adversarial network attack methods. Without
loss of generality, we record their running time on Cora
dataset. In Fig. 6, we can see that the running time of both
direct FGA and NETTACK increases linearly with the num-
ber of modified links, while the running time of NETTACK
is significantly more than that of FGA. This is reasonable,
because NETTACK needs to select candidate links based
on the degree distribution in each iteration, which largely
increases the time complexity of this method.
T
im
e 
(s
)

Direct FGA:                            NETTACK:                           
Fig. 6: The running time of direct FGA and NETTACK.
3.3.2 Hub-node attack
The nodes of higher centrality are considered as hubs, which
play important roles in many network dynamics. Various
centrality metrics [44]–[46] were proposed, and we use the
degree centrality [47] here. We then choose 40 hub nodes
of largest degree in each network as our target nodes. The
attack results on the hub nodes are presented in TABLE 4.
Again, we find that the unlimited FGA still outperforms
all the other considered attack methods. The direct FGA
follows, which performs better than the NETTACK and
DICE in most cases, indicating the effectiveness of our
FGA method on disturbing network embeddings of hub
nodes in a network. The difference is that, at this time,
the indirect FGA loses its effectiveness even in the dense
networks of Cora and Citeseer, suggesting that changing the
links far away from hub nodes has little influence on these
nodes, since they always have a lot of neighbors, making
their embeddings much more robust. Overall, by comparing
TABLE 3 and TABLE 4, we can find that the embeddings of
hub nodes are relatively difficult to attack, i.e., the same
attack methods obtain smaller ASR and larger AML on
the corresponding same network embedding methods and
datasets, for the hub nodes than for the normal ones.
3.3.3 Bridge-node attack
Since many real-world networks have modular and hierar-
chical structure, those nodes connecting different communi-
ties play key roles to make the whole network connected
and further dominate the information spreading on the
network. These nodes, namely bridge nodes, are thus as
important as hub nodes and should be preferentially pro-
tected. The bridge nodes are always of higher betweenness
centrality [48], [49] which is defined as the ratio of the
shortest paths passing through the target node among all
the shortest paths in the network. We thus use this metric
to choose 40 nodes of highest betweenness centrality as
our bridge nodes, and the attack results on their network
embedding are presented in TABLE 5.
Similarly, the unlimited FGA performs best. By compari-
son, the direct FGA still performs better than the NETTACK
and DICE in most cases, suggesting that our FGA method
is also useful in attacking bridge nodes between different
communities in a network. Again, the indirect FGA behaves
9TABLE 4: The attack effects on hub node, in terms of ASR and AML, obtained by different attack methods on various
network embedding methods and multiple datasets. Here, ASR is obtained by changing 20 links.
Dataset NEM
ASR (%) AML
FGA Baseline FGA Baseline
Unlimited Direct Indirect NETTACK DICE RA Unlimited Direct Indirect NETTACK DICE RA
Pol.Blogs
GCN 50.00 45.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 14.78 15.28 19.70 18.95 19.50 20.00
GraRep 62.50 57.50 2.50 5.00 17.50 0.00 15.72 16.05 19.55 19.45 19.20 20.00
DeepWalk 53.85 50.00 2.50 12.50 22.50 0.00 16.00 16.82 19.77 19.20 19.18 20.00
node2vec 32.50 45.00 5.00 12.50 17.50 0.00 17.62 17.95 19.20 19.20 19.05 20.00
LINE 20.26 12.21 5.00 5.00 20.00 0.00 18.57 19.02 19.31 19.30 19.70 20.00
GraphGAN 25.00 17.50 2.50 2.56 12.50 0.00 18.68 18.77 19.52 19.67 19.35 20.00
Average 40.69 37.86 3.75 7.92 16.67 0.00 16.90 17.32 19.51 19.30 19.16 20.00
Cora
GCN 88.90 87.18 54.54 85.71 48.57 4.74 6.48 6.62 14.37 8.64 11.38 18.25
GraRep 84.26 78.69 48.52 77.50 54.86 6.74 7.90 8.08 12.71 9.97 11.06 18.16
DeepWalk 85.63 80.50 43.75 77.50 60.50 10.27 7.57 7.73 13.70 10.47 11.24 18.18
node2vec 81.82 80.34 41.96 74.38 55.80 7.68 7.22 7.52 13.05 10.81 12.43 19.70
LINE 85.25 83.96 46.90 77.10 57.69 9.96 8.01 8.25 13.24 10.00 12.60 19.00
GraphGAN 84.36 82.57 48.74 73.87 54.81 6.20 8.00 8.15 12.98 9.52 11.91 19.87
Average 85.04 82.21 47.40 77.68 55.37 7.60 7.53 7.73 13.34 9.90 11.77 18.86
Citeseer
GCN 100 100 65.71 97.22 52.06 2.42 5.11 5.23 9.77 7.89 16.40 19.89
GraRep 88.89 87.89 11.11 87.30 61.11 5.52 12.06 11.61 18.69 12.16 15.06 19.06
DeepWalk 88.89 86.89 8.33 84.44 61.11 6.34 10.67 12.14 18.89 13.03 14.36 19.42
node2vec 86.11 88.89 13.51 84.44 55.56 7.62 13.08 12.14 18.03 13.19 14.75 19.60
LINE 89.19 86.11 13.89 87.22 41.67 5.66 11.11 12.56 18.39 13.00 16.53 19.81
GraphGAN 89.19 88.89 5.56 87.14 50.00 4.08 13.47 11.95 19.17 12.43 15.17 19.78
Average 90.38 90.28 19.69 87.96 53.59 5.27 10.92 10.94 17.16 11.95 15.38 19.59
TABLE 5: The attack effects on bridge node, in terms of ASR and AML, obtained by different attack methods on various
network embedding methods and multiple datasets. Here, ASR is obtained by changing 20 links.
Dataset NEM
ASR (%) AML
FGA Baseline FGA Baseline
Unlimited Direct Indirect NETTACK DICE RA Unlimited Direct Indirect NETTACK DICE RA
Pol.Blogs
GCN 62.16 54.05 5.26 45.95 8.96 0.00 14.65 14.95 19.29 13.08 19.35 20.00
GraRep 45.95 44.74 5.26 27.03 13.16 0.00 17.22 16.47 19.42 18.00 19.08 20.00
DeepWalk 36.84 36.84 7.89 28.21 26.32 2.51 17.08 17.61 18.82 17.31 17.55 19.68
node2vec 50.00 52.63 5.26 28.21 21.05 2.51 16.21 16.03 19.13 17.38 18.39 19.80
LINE 45.68 40.26 7.89 31.58 10.53 0.00 16.90 17.10 19.26 17.21 19.05 20.00
GraphGAN 30.77 25.79 5.26 26.32 10.53 0.00 17.92 18.25 19.37 17.50 19.08 20.00
Average 45.23 42.39 6.14 31.22 15.09 0.84 16.66 16.74 19.22 16.75 18.75 20.00
Cora
GCN 92.59 88.89 55.56 86.21 50.52 3.06 4.63 4.78 10.93 7.07 15.61 19.90
GraRep 90.91 90.32 39.39 87.10 72.73 8.06 7.88 8.45 14.73 8.97 10.61 18.89
DeepWalk 93.75 90.32 28.12 82.35 68.75 7.79 7.91 8.03 16.03 8.53 11.59 19.31
node2vec 93.75 86.67 40.00 84.85 68.75 6.90 8.25 9.03 14.46 8.61 10.38 19.56
LINE 93.33 88.31 42.56 85.35 73.33 7.02 7.67 8.52 14.02 9.06 11.10 19.00
GraphGAN 90.62 90.00 33.33 87.50 60.00 5.85 8.69 8.87 15.97 8.44 11.83 19.64
Average 92.49 89.09 39.83 85.56 65.68 6.45 7.51 7.95 14.36 8.45 11.85 19.38
Citeseer
GCN 96.97 96.97 66.67 82.59 58.32 3.25 4.94 5.03 11.61 7.63 14.90 19.53
GraRep 96.77 96.67 35.48 89.67 70.00 10.24 8.94 9.50 16.61 9.67 12.17 18.96
DeepWalk 93.33 93.33 20.69 86.67 70.97 12.06 8.80 9.33 18.76 9.40 12.90 18.65
node2vec 93.33 90.32 26.67 86.55 76.67 11.64 9.63 9.06 16.27 10.21 10.87 19.02
LINE 94.44 91.02 26.67 83.33 74.19 12.04 8.89 9.20 15.92 10.87 11.00 18.37
GraphGAN 93.55 93.33 19.35 82.59 66.67 9.50 8.97 8.33 17.87 9.22 12.87 19.26
Average 94.73 93.61 33.29 85.23 69.47 9.79 8.36 8.41 16.17 9.50 12.45 18.97
much worse than the direct FGA as well as the NETTACK
and DICE, suggesting that changing the links far away can
rarely influence these bridge nodes. Overall, by comparing
the results in TABLE 5 and those in TABLE 3 and TABLE 4,
we can find that the embeddings of bridge nodes are rela-
tively difficult to attack than those of normal ones, but are
relatively easier to attack than those of hub nodes.
3.4 Community Deception
Network embedding can map a network into a vector space,
where each node is represented by a vector of relatively
low dimension. As a result, many network algorithms, such
as community detection [50]–[52], can be realized in this
vector space by using some machine learning methods.
Community deception [35]–[37], on the contrary, is used
to protect certain nodes from identifying by community
detection methods. Since our FGA methods can be used to
disturb network embeddings, we thus think that they can
also be used in community deception. In this experiment,
we first use GCN to generate the adversarial network; then
we use the network embedding methods to generate node
embedding vectors, based on which we get the community
detection results by adopting the simple K-means method.
We use the following two datasets for community detection.
• PloBook: This network represents co-purchasing of
books about US politics sold by the online book-
seller [53]. In this network, nodes represent books about
US politics sold by the online bookseller Amazon.com,
and two nodes are connected if the corresponding two
books were co-purchased by the same buyers. There
are 105 books and 441 links in total, and the books
belongs to three communities, namely liberal, neutral
and conservative.
• Dolphins: This social network represents the com-
mon interactions observed between a group of dol-
phins in a community living off Doubtful Sound, New
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TABLE 6: The attack effects on community detection, in terms of ASR and AML, obtained by different attack methods on
various network embedding methods and multiple datasets. Here, ASR is obtained by changing 20 links.
Data sets NEM
ASR (%) AML
FGA Baseline FGA Baseline
Unlimited Direct Indirect NETTACK DICE RA Unlimited Direct Indirect NETTACK DICE RA
PloBook
GraRep 96.77 91.67 34.92 89.37 74.19 3.28 6.77 7.97 16.33 10.27 10.74 19.39
DeepWalk 93.55 88.64 22.95 87.06 77.42 4.76 7.84 8.70 18.33 11.56 12.27 19.22
node2vec 92.06 90.26 19.05 86.30 44.44 1.61 8.68 9.01 18.41 11.83 15.57 19.76
LINE 90.48 85.35 17.46 84.12 53.97 3.17 8.89 9.26 18.73 12.69 14.25 19.52
GraphGAN 93.65 89.21 17.46 81.18 53.23 3.28 8.32 8.34 18.63 12.51 14.60 19.38
Average 93.30 89.03 22.37 85.61 60.65 3.22 8.10 8.66 18.09 11.77 13.49 19.45
Dolphin
GraRep 100 95.35 54.55 21.05 59.09 4.76 3.71 4.59 14.32 18.20 13.23 19.05
DeepWalk 100 100 68.18 10.00 72.73 9.09 3.64 4.39 13.45 18.15 13.18 18.45
node2vec 100 100 63.64 20.00 57.14 9.09 3.41 4.25 14.00 18.50 13.24 18.27
LINE 100 98.69 59.09 10.00 68.18 9.52 4.00 4.40 13.73 19.65 12.87 18.81
GraphGAN 100 96.57 50.00 5.26 76.19 10.00 4.00 4.61 14.50 19.50 11.76 18.10
Average 100 98.12 59.09 13.26 66.67 8.49 3.75 4.45 14.00 18.80 12.86 18.54
Network representationAdversarial networkOriginal network of Polbook Links selectionNetwork representation
Link
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Target: 49
Fig. 7: The visualization of FGA on network embedding of a random target node in PolBook. The purple node represents
the target node and the purple link is selected by our FGA due to its largest gradient. Except for the target node, the nodes
of same color belongs to the same community.
Network representationNetwork representation Original network of Dolphins Links selection Adversarial network
Link
...
12 27
12 54
12 26
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Target: 12
Fig. 8: The visualization of FGA on network embedding of a random target node in Dolphins. The purple node represents
the target node and the purple link is selected by our FGA due to its largest gradient. Except for the target node, the nodes
of same color belongs to the same community.
Zealand [54]. There are 62 dolphins and 159 links in
total, and the dolphins are partitioned into two groups
by the temporary disappearance of dolphin number.
In this experiment, suppose we know the community
that each node belongs to in advance. For each network,
we randomly select 20% nodes in each category to train our
GCN, with the training and validation sets being of equal
size, while the rest 80% nodes are used for testing. For all
the network embedding methods considered here, the di-
mension of embedding vector is set to 20. Note that, without
attack, the nodes in an original network can also be turned
into vectors by each network embedding method, and then
are grouped into communities by K-means method. There
might be some nodes that are wrongly clustered themselves
without any attack, and these nodes will not be considered
as the target nodes here, i.e., we only attack those nodes that
can be corrected clustered initially.
The community deception results are shown in TABLE 6,
where we can see that these results are consistent with those
in node classification, i.e., for each network embedding
method on each dataset, the unlimited FGA outperforms
all the others, direct FGA behaves better than NETTACK
and DICE, while all of them behaves much better than
the random attack. These results indicate that our FGA
can also be used to attack community detection algorithms
by disturbing network embeddings. Note that, we exclude
GCN here, since GCN is in nature a supervised learning
method, and thus is not suitable for community detection.
In order to make our FGA method easier to understand,
we visualize the FGA on network embedding of a random
target node in PolBook and Dolphins, as shown in Fig. 7
and Fig. 8, respectively. Here, we adopt the unlimited
FGA and use the low-dimensional network representations
learned by DeepWalk as the input to the visualization tool
t-SNE [55]. We find that the embedding vector of the target
node changes a lot even when only one link is changed in
each network, indicating the powerful ability of FGA on
disturbing network embedding methods.
11
4 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a framework to generate adver-
sarial networks using GCN, based on which we realize a
fast gradient attack (FGA) on network embedding. In this
method, we first extract the gradient of pairwise nodes
based on the adversarial network, and then select the pair of
nodes with maximum absolute link gradient to realize the
attack and update the adversarial network, and so forth.
This iterative process is terminated when the number of
modified links reaches certain predefined value. We conduct
numerous experiments, such as uniform attack, hub-node
attack and bridge-node attack on six network embedding
methods, these embedding vectors are further used to clas-
sify nodes in three networks. The results suggest that, in
any case, our proposed FGA outperform the other baseline
attack methods, achieving the state-of-the-art results. The
experiment on community deception also validates the ef-
fectiveness of FGA on disturbing network embeddings.
Every coin has two sides, network embedding methods
and the corresponding attack methods could be improved
iteratively. Therefore, in future, we will also try to propose
new network embedding methods that are more robust to
the adversarial attacks generated by FGA.
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